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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
DEITI SCHVAXEVELDT, 
Plaintiff and Resp0t1,dent, 
-w.-
NOY-BU[m :MJ LLING & PROCESSIKG 
CORPORATIOX, et al., 
Defendant and Appellants. 
APPBLLANTS' BRIEF 
Case :No. 
9031 
The facts are briefly that the plaintiff. through an ac-
quaintance and friend, Jl;lr. \V. J<;_ Reaves (one ot the in-
rlividlml defendants) at his home in Preston, Idaho, 
learnl:'d of a uranium mine located in St. George, Utah, 
ovrned by the Ji;p:.:olon Uranium ·Company. Sometime in 
the latter part of August, 1955, the plaillt.i:ff in company 
\~ith his wife, and defendant Beaves and wife, joume-yed 
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to the said mira~ located some 60 miles west of St. tlPorge, 
Utal1 lo examine H1c mine. On thi~ occasion the plaintiff 
met several of the individual defendants named and was 
informed of a milling process invented by two of the in-
<lividual ,]:_,l.endants, SJW(·il'ically Clark Chad hum and H. 
L. Newh'". 1-'laint.iff made a paymcnl of $5,500 for stock 
in tl1e er1ter·pri~c and was given a receipt lherefor (Bx-
hibit P-Hl). The eorporaie defendant is a rtah eorpora-
tion, whose Arti(·le~ of Incorporation were filed v.'ith the 
Secretary of State on the 16th day of February, 1956. 
'T'he individual named defendants signed llw said Artides 
m: incorporators. Several mePtings \1ere held hy the in-
dividual defendants in company with the plaintiff, speci-
fically one in Kovember, 19~):-J at Salt Lake City, na11. 
following the meeting -..~'ith the attorney who drafted the 
eorpoYate Artir!les, tl1e ~eeond meeting in St. George in 
early December, 1955, and h1·o or tl1ree meeting~ in Janu-
ary, 1955, at which the prDspectivc corponttion was dis-
cusr;ed and the venture of milling uranium ore to be done 
by said prospective corporation was di~rni<~ed. During 
the months of ,January and February 1956 plaintiff paid 
the ~um of $8,000.00 as part payment on a commitment to 
pay $10,000.00 in orde-r to obtain 15,000 shares of tlw de-
fendant corporation stock At the time of the above-TJOied 
payment by plaintiff, defendant corporation 11·M not 
registered with the State Securities Commissioll. Xo 
certificate of stock was ever issued to the plaintiff. In 
conncetion with the stock purchase, it was agreed between 
the plaintiff and the defendants that upon payment of 
the full $10,000.00 and upo-n incorporation of the corpo-
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3 
rate defendant, plaintiff would be made a director of said 
corporation. On March 20, 1957, under Section 61-1-::!;'i, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, plaintiff initiated 
an action to rescind the sale and request a refund of the 
$8,000.00 paid in by him in J-anuary and February of 
1956. From judgment for the plaintiff, defendants appeal. 
' 
Additional det.ailOO facts will be quoted and discussed 
in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF POIXT8 
POINT 1 
THE DISTRICT COT:RT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAl:->f'I'IFF WAS NOT A PROMOTER OF THE CORPORATE 
DEFENDANT. 
POINT II 
THE STA'i'UTE RELl.ED UPON WAS NOT DESIGNED 
OR INTE~DF~D TO APPLY TO PAR'I'IES SUCH AS THE 
PLAINTIFF WHO ARE POSSESSED OF AT.L THE FACTS 
SUCH A REGISTRA'TION WOULD PROVIDE. 
POI~T I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED I:"! HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS )lOT A PROSfOTER OF THE CORPORATE 
DEFF;NDA::-<T. 
The Trial Court in this matter in an Order entered 
December 13, 1958 modifying the Pre-trial Order, said: 
'·The eourt is of tlw opinion that there will 
be an issue of faet as to >vhether or not the plain-
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4 
tiff was one of the actual promoters of tho organi-
zation and will hold as a matter of law that If he 
was such a promoter, that the statute relied upon 
by tho plaintiff does not apply irJ this ca.~e." 
Appellants contend that the evidence was dear, wn-
vincing aml overwhelming that the plaintiff was in fact 
a promoter of the defendant corporation. 
A wf:ll-recognized definition of "promoter'' iR found 
Ul Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, \"ohune I, Section 
189 at Page 597 and reads in part: 
" ... includes those who undertake to fono a 
corporation and to procure for it the rights, in-
str-umentalities and capital hy which it is to carry 
out the purposes set forth in its charter, and t{l 
establish it as fully able to do ilc;; business." 
Continuing at Page 598: 
" ... anyone who actively assists in promoting, 
projecting and organizing a corporation, whether 
as a business or in a ;:.ingle corporate :instance, is 
a promoter." 
And again at Page 599: 
'"Those who contract w:ith or otherwise join 
the first movers toward~ incorporation and to the 
same end are also promoters, and though a person 
does not become liable as a promoter by reason 
of the fact that hi.- agent for a spedal purpose 
promotes a corporation \\·ith the idea of obtainin_g 
a personal adYantage in executing his agency, II 
\l"ould HN'Jil 1 hat a Yen little will make a person 
a promoter if it C<"lll be seen that he was really 
doing something in tlw 'my of speculation for 
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5 
his own interest and was not acting merely a;; the 
agent of another." 
Further, at Page 600: 
''In determining the question whether a person 
actually wa~ a promoter, due consideration must 
be given to the facts of the particular ca::;e and in 
any event ::mch question is one of fact for the 
jury.'' 
The treatise above noted has collected in the foot-
note~ to the above fluotations a legion of cases eitller 
quoting the definition's language or giving rise to the 
language thorein. 
'rhis Fletcher's dcl'inition of ''promoter" haR been 
adopted by tlriR court in the case of Powerine Company v. 
Rnssells, Inc. (1943) 103 rtah 4-1-1, 135 Pac. 2nd 906, and 
the first sentenee above quoted appears m the body of 
the court's opinion in that case. 
Appellant therefore v.ishes to review those facts 
in this instant case which indicate that the plaintiff was 
an active promoter of the defendant corporation. 
Plaintiff admitted on cro~s-examination (R. 97) and 
in his affidavit in ~>upport or the }:fotion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 22) that he fir~:;t learned of the proposed 
corporate defendant in August of 1955, and admitted in 
the said affidavit that he paid $5,500.00 "which at his op-
tion" was to be issued either in Ep~olon r:-mnium Com-
pany or in Noy-Bnrn Mming and Proce::~sing Company, 
the corporate defendant herein; as :further evidenced by 
receipt introduced as Exhibit P-10. At the time of the 
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trial, plaintiff was insistent that all he purchased in Aug-
ust or Septemb&r of 1955 was Epsolon stock, and the 
Chadburn process belonged to the said Epsolon CompMy. 
He said further that his first knowledge of the eorporat1~ 
defendant eoming into being was at the Decembrr 3rd 
meeting at the Xewby home. Yet, under cross-examina-
tion (R. 99-101) }a! testified that he knew of the proposed 
defendant. corporation; that further, he knew the process 
wa~ the invention of Chadburn, and that the proposed 
defendant corporation was being organized to use that 
process. He learned all 1.his as of August of 1955 and 
not for the first time in De<.'ember of that year. 
Plaintiff in hi~ testin1ony daims the "offer'' of stock 
in the defendant corporation that he "acr,epted" first oc-
curred in a convcrHltion with Dell Wood ;Jrumary 3,1956 
(H. 18-79), the substance of which was that if he did pay 
$10,000 into the Xoy-Burn Company, he wonld he giv~11 
15,000 ~hares and a directorship on i Is board. In contra-
diction of this proposition there are ;:.ewral stubborn 
piece~ of evidence. First, p!aiJJtifT\ .S110rn ;:.t.atement in 
his affidavit above noted; E.xhibit P-10 above noted; and 
the minul<'A of No:·-Burn organizer~ attached to the 
deposition of Dell ·wood marked ·'Exhibit 1-C'' and "F,x-
lrilJit 1-D," dated respectively December 2 and 3, 1955 
and Januar~- I:\, 19!:i6. The pertinent paragraph from 
the December minutes read: 
"Motion hY Delov Carter that we carrr the 
11·orking ap.TPPl~ent. of a joint n•nture as it siands 
with 1\'11 men and that 11 (' flgrc'C' that the joint ven-
ture group ba('.k Ur. Clark Chad burn on his per-
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sonal agreement in the ::;tock issue he promised to 
Mr. Dee Sehuanevcldt." 
And from the January minutes: 
"Dell Wood and 'T'cU Beavis was appointed to 
see .\1 r'. Dee Sehuancvcldt and again work out the 
di1Icrcnces in ae<:epting lriF $10,000 for tJw Xoy-
Burn Milling and Proceoming Company. After 
SO!Tll' long discussions and ever,yone coming to 
agreement, the following was accepted: 
"}fr. Dec Schuanevcldt agrees again thai he 
will still &cept the agreement set forth some 
\l'(:'l'k~ ago, which were on Deeembc.r 3, 1955, awl 
he will give thi~ milling _joint ventlUe the sum of 
$10,000 as liOOil as he recBives this from the sale 
of his farm." 
In addition is the tcJ>timony of Dell \Vood (R. 188) that 
the "commitment'' of Clark Clmdburn to ~fr. Schvanc-
veldt was a commitmo:mt to give the plaintiff 15,000 shares 
of~ oy-Burn stock upon his investing $10,000.00. 
The plaintiff's position seems to be that he felt the 
milling process was all the property of /<~pmlon Com-
pany in which he was interested; th.at in the De0ember 
meeting he first learned of Noy-Hurn and attempted to 
dissuade Mr. Chadburn from putting tlw milling process 
into this new corporation yet to be organized. That there-
after, upon learning of the formation of tl1e new company, 
he bought 6tock in it, havi11g been o;olieited to do so re-
peatedly by each of the individual defendants prior to his 
making any pa~went. 
As above noted, thP, faeto; are the plaintiff lrnew of the 
separate corporation to be formed as of August or Sep-
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tember, 1955. He knew the invention was not Epsolon'1 
property, but rather Chadburn's, as further corroborateC 
by the testimony of H. L. Newby (R. 160~163), and h1 
attempted repeatedly to get stock in it, rarninding Mr. 
Chadburn of a personal commitment to ~ell bim ~oy. 
Dum ~tock in December, and further negotiating to ob. 
tain a director~hip in addition in January. 
Jn that ('.onneciion, the trial court (R. 151) pointed 
out the obvious in(·onsistem·y of plaintiff's position re-
garding the Deeember meptinp:, and asked the plaintiff 
what business it would have been of the defendants organ-
izing :'\o.\-Hum to be ('Oncerned with or enter in their 
minutes any reference to a "c·orrunitment" of Chadburn 
to c;ell Epc<olon c;tock to the plaintiff. Tl1e plaintiff's an-
swer was evasive but in substance wa~ that l1e 11-u~ con-
cerned about protecting the Epsolon Company in keeping 
the venture all as one big company. 
Without multiplying words, the record is replete with 
references to the effect that plaintiff -was intimately asso. 
ciated with all the defendantc< during this period of de-
veloping the mill: that he was familiar in detail with the 
propn>'f'd pnwe~~; that he knew one rea~on for organiz-
ing the eorporate defendant was to rC'gi>'tt>r the stock with 
thc· State f'eeuritir~ Commission, which had not Leen dl)ne 
with tlw !·~psolon Corporation. 
!•'urthPr, during January of 1956 plaintiff sold some 
nf hi~ O\rn ><tcwk in tllC' 1-:psolon Company (at a 1500% 
markup) to tlw JorgC'n>:'-c'n>< and Yearsley~. at the same 
tim{' mnJ,ing IIi~ pa~·1w'nt>:'- on the Noy-Burn stock. He 
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9 
couldn't remember whether or rwt he used the money 
received from them to buy hi.<; Noy-Burn stock (R. 139). 
He further admitted that when he sold the Epsolon stock 
he told the Jorgensen::; and Yearsle,H of the proposed 
Noy-Burn and the desirability of getting stock in that 
company. In his own testimony he insisted that he told 
them he was selling them his own personal Epsolon stock 
(R.128-1+±). Later in the tef'timony plaintiff admitted he 
had not intended to se!l his own stock and he did not wish 
to do f'O. In the ''last conversation" (R.159-160) he told 
them i r he could not get the stock somewhere else, he 
would sell them his own. \Vlwn Mr. .Torgemen testified, 
he said Sdrvaneveldt told them the F:psolon stock they 
were purchasing in January of 1956 ·was not his personal 
stock but rather belonged to a Nevada golf pro named 
Linstrom, and at the same time enrouraged Jorgensens 
to buy into the Noy-Burn Company (R. 197). The Jor-
genscns did in fact pay plaintiff $1,000 for Noy-Burn 
8tol'i( in AjJril of 1956. B.Y way of defense plaintiff in-
sil'tcd that this sale wa:> not to promote Noy-Burn Com-
PaJIY, but rather a private sale of his own Koy-Burn 
stock. Jorgensen's testimony was that plain tifT never dis-
closed to him that the \foy-Rum stock that they were 
pmchasing belonged to plaintiff; that. in fact plaintiff 
helped the Jorgeusens to sell some of their Epsolon stock 
in order to buy into the Xoy-Burn Company (R. 200). 
Sometime in January of 1956 plaintiff attended a 
meeting in Logan, Utah at the home of \V. E. Beaves, at 
whir.h meeting F; psolon Company ~tockholders were pres-
ent. The testimony of Heaves (R. 176, 17i) indicated that 
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Schvaneveldt indicated to the Epsolon stockholders at this 
meeting that Noy-Burn Company owned the milling proc-
es~. thought it a good venture and told the Epsolon stock-
holders he would "negotiatD" on behalf of Epwlon with 
X oy-Bum Company corJcerning the process, ihus enhanc-
ing their own inw~tmcnt. Plaintiff, in his own testimony 
(R. 125), denied making any statement of negotiating on 
behalf of _~<;po;olon with Xoy-Burn to share the milling 
proce~:~s and profit~. \Vhen he was confronted, however, 
·with Exhibit D-7 whieh was a letter containing words of 
that import, he admitted having written t1c letter. 
l•'ollowing payments made hy the plaintiff, he admit-
ted (R 110-111) that it ·was explairlCd to him the only 
reason he \\"RS not immediately made a rncrnber of the 
board of director~ o£ the nt'IY company 1\"fl.~ that his name 
did not appear in the drafted Articles of lncorporati011 
about to be filed; that he was further told that after in-
corporation he would he voted a member of the board of 
directors of the defendant corporation. 
In summary, it appea1·::: thi~ plaintiff knew of the 
proposed defcudant corporation months before it came 
into beinp: '1·hen he paid his first money in August or 
September of 19tJ5 to reserve the option to bu) into it. 
In December he reminded Chadburn of tlmt commitment, 
and the others agreed to permit him to come into the 
enterprise upon a paynwnt of $10,000 for which be would 
receiw 1.\000 ~hn res of shwk and a direetorsl1ip. In .Tanu-
nn of l~l!lG lw 1'-nld ~ome Epsolo~ ~hwk in order to buy 
inin thr- vntPrpri~c. pa~·ing- $8.000 of thl· $10,000 comrnit-
t,•d. at the ~nnw time telling- others, specifically the .Tor-
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gensens and Year·slc.ys and ~psolon stockholders, of the 
:Noy-Burn Company's pro~pects. He wrote a lette-r on 
behalf of l!Jpsolon to Noy-Burn discussing division of 
profits. In February the Nay-Burn Company carne into 
being. In .\pril he in fact sold some No~-Burn stock. 
It would, therefore, appear that under Fletcher's 
definition, plain tilT has done a good deal more than "very 
little'' in joining with tho?. first movers to laurwh the Nay-
Hum f'nterprise. He further was cle<~.rly doing "some-
thing in the way of o:peculation for his own interest anrl 
not merely acting as the agent of another." 
POINT II 
THE STATUTE RELIED "C"PON WAS NOT DESIGNED 
OR INTENDED TO APPLY TO PARTIES SUCH AS THE 
PLAINTIFF WHO ARE POSSESSED OF ALL THE FACTS 
SUCH A REGISTR.A'TION WOULD PROVIDE. 
It is the appellant's position that the statute relied 
upon by the plaintifr was designed t.o protect the ~tock­
bu;>ring pnhlic by requiring issuers to divulge pertinent 
inforrnatiort through registration with the State Secmi-
ties Commission. Appellant contends that the plaintifi 
was possessed ot all possible information which a regi;;;-
tration in this instance would have provided. 
Appellant further urges that this court construe 
our Rccurities Ad in !ftto same manner as the l'nited 
~tates Supreme Court has construed the registration por-
tion of the Securities Act of 1933. 
In the case of SecJ!,rities and Exchange CommMsion 
v. Ralston Purina Compa-ny, B4!l U.S. 119, 73 Supreme 
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Court 981, 97 Law Edition 1494, the court said in definillg 
that Act, at page ] 24 the following: 
"J<;xemption from the registration require-
ments of the Securities Act is the question. The 
design of the statute i~ to protect investors by 
promoting full disclosure of infonnation thought 
necessary to informed investment decisions. The 
natural way to interpret the private offering \'X-
emption is in light of statutory purpose. Since 
exempt transactions are those to which there is no 
practical need for (the bill\) application, the ap-
plicability or§ 4 (1) should turn on -whether the 
particular class of persons arfccted need the pro-
tection of the Act. An offering to those who are 
shown to he able to fend for them~clves is a tram.-
ad ion not involving any public offering." 
Again, continuing at page 125: 
"The exemption, as we construe it, does not 
deprive corporation employees, a~; a class, of the 
safeguards of the Act. v,~ e agree that some em-
ployee offerings may come \\·ithin § -l- (1), e.g. one 
made to executive personnel who because of their 
position han; access to the ~;a~ne kind of informa-
tion that the act would make available in the form 
of a regi~tratiYP statement. .\hsent such a show-
ing of speeial circumstance~. employees are just as 
mueh member~; of the inYe~tint< 'public' as any of 
their neighbor~ in tlw community." 
And final!~-. at page 1::!1: 
"'l'hP f,,,·n~ of inquiry should be on the need 
of the nfft•rt't'~ for the prntc.,etion~ afforded by 
regi~trntitm. The employees here \\"Pre not sho:m 
tn ha\·P nt'<'f'~~ to tlw kind of informati{)ll which 
registrati<lll would disclose. 'l'he obvious oppl)r-
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13 
tunities for pressure and imposition make it ad-
visable that they be entitled to compliance with 
§ 5." 
This Ralston case has since been often cited and ap-
proved by the l._Tnited States Supreme Comi-- -most re-
cently .in Detwer rnion 8tock Yard Company v. Pro-
dtteers Li·vestock .illa.rkel:i-ng Association, 356 U.S. 282, 
~~7; 78 Supreme Court 7:18, Hl; 2 L. _ij;d, 2d 711,775. It 
has also been quoted by 1.he Colorado Supreme Court in 
Central Ha-nk and Trust Company v. Robinson, 107 Colo. 
409, 417; 326 Pac. 2nd 82, 87. 
In relation to this argument the facts show that the 
plaintiff had virtually daily contact v,.ith most, if not all, 
of the other organizers of the corporate defendant, and he 
had long discussions with each of them about its pros-
pect~; that he knew about the process and the mill. TT e at-
tended most, if not all, significant meetings of the group 
and was mentioned by name in the minutes of at least 
two of said meetings, and he encouraged other people 
to invest in the proposed corporation, all p1ior to its gain-
ing a corporate existence. In short, it would appear he 
was as well informed about the corporation as any of 
the incorporators. 
A rcgil;tration, thererore, with the State Securities 
Commission could not afford him with. any information 
that he did not already possess. 
In that connection, the Record at Page 159, lines 12 
through 15 read: 
"THJIJ COL-ItT: Go ahead, sir, whcth~r you 
considered your::~elf one of the general public or 
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somaone recciviiJg special con><ideration in the pur-
chase of thls stock. 
"A. J considered myself as someone being a 
special purchaser." 
This testimony of the plaintiff indicated that he felt 
at the time of the purehase he was a iipccial purr.haser-
in short-an inffider. 
CONCLT~SIOX 
For the foregoing reasons, appellants respectfully 
contend that this court should order that the judgment 
of the District Court be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDOX A. M.ADS~jN 
Attorney fm- Defendants and 
Appellants 
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